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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER E. MULLINS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 14407
RALPH M. EVANS and ROYAL
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, INC.,
a California corporation,
Defendants and
Appellants,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff to enforce a
contract and to collect unpaid money due as a two per cent (2%)
commission on the sales price of a certain machine being sold
by the defendants but in part designed and developed by the
plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court sitting with a jury, the
Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, District Judge presiding.

The jury

found all of the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants.

The court entered judgment accordingly.

said verdict and judgment, defendants appeal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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From

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
I
Plaintiff-respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case were presented to the jury for its
determination.

The jurors answered special interrogatories re-

quested by defendants and made findings in accordance with the
evidence in favor of the plaintiff.

In addition to answering

the interrogatories, the jurors returned verdicts favorable to
the plaintiff (R 575 to 589).
A substantial percentage of the facts, as abstracted in
appellants1 brief and contained within the abstract ordered by
the court, does not fairly represent the evidence in a light
most favorable to the jury's findings and the respondent herein
or is absent from the abstract.

For this reason, it will be

necessary for respondent to frequently refer to the original
record.

It is also respectfully pointed out that none of the

exhibits were abstracted by appellants.
The facts hereinafter set forth represent the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom and will be viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's
findings and verdict (Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company,
5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622; Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District vs. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 353, 358 P.2d 81).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Walter E. Mullins, the plaintiff and respondent herein,
is an employee of Chicago Bridge & Iron Works in Salt Lake City,
Utah*

He has been so employed for in excess of twenty years in

the maintenance department.

Defendant and appellant, Ralph M.

Evans, at one time was a neighbor of Mullins and had prevailed
upon him to construct a boat trailer.

Mullins is talented in

the use of his hands in the construction of equipment and machinery and possesses an abundance of workable ideas for the
improvement of machinery*
In the early part of 1966, Evans approached Mullins about
constructing a new machine for laminating plastic to counter
tops.

Evans foresaw the need for a machine that would laminate

the plastic to the wood top in one piece which would be a great
improvement over other processes being then presently used.

He

conferred with Mullins and the two of them, after looking at
various other devices, worked on ideas for the construction of
the machine in question (R 488-491).

Mullins was not only to

build the machine but added his own ideas concerning safety doors,
roller apparatus and devices which would make the machine safe
and more workable (R 492-493).

After considerable effort,

Mullins finally manufactured the first machine at home, working
nights and weekends.

Evans then suggested that if Mullins

would construct the machines as Evans sold them, they would both
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hopefully make money0

They agreed Mullins would provide the

labor in making the first machines at a very nominal charge.
Evans would pay for the costs of the material and the nominal
labor charges going into the first machines until the business
got going.

Thereafter, there would be a partnership in the

profits in that Mullins was to receive a percentage (R 497,
539, 566). Production commenced and Evans soon sold several
machines to customers based upon the initial design and the
picture of the first machine (Exhibit P-l).

He would then

advise Mullins of the sale and request Mullins to build and
deliver as fast as possible (R 490-493, 496-497, 539-540).

A

larger shop was rented by Mullins and more people hired.
Mullins calculated the approximate number of hours it took to
make the first machine.

Based upon a small labor charge for

himself and the actual labor cost of those working with him on
the machine,he estimated the minimum labor charge for the machine at $300.00, so that Evans could establish a sales price.
After approximately thirty (30) machines had been sold
by Evans, he discussed with Mullins the advantages of moving
the manufacturing operation from Mullins1 shop in Salt Lake
City to Glendale, Arizona where Evans was residing.

It was

suggested by Evans that they could set up a plant as partners
and at that time, he offered Mullins a partnership in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

business of producing and selling the machine.

Mullins would

have to move to Arizona and work with Evans in the business.
Mullins felt that his seniority with his employer was such that
he could not risk quitting his job and gamble on the success of
the sales of the machines to support his family.

He then dis-

cussed with Evans the possibility of Evans buying out his
interest in the machine and his ideas contributing to the
success of the machine for a sale price of $10,000«00 in casho
Evans indicated he did not have sufficient capital at that time
to make a lump-sum payment but suggested Mullins accept a two
per cent (2%) commission on the sale price of each of the machines sold for his interest in the machine and business0
Mullins agreed to this.

Thereafter, Evans returned to Arizona

and drew up the contract granting Mullins a 2% commission on
the sale price of the machines.

The unfinished machines, jigs,

and other parts were moved from Salt Lake City to Arizona.
Mullins1 brother went along with the equipment to assist Evans
in getting into production (Exhibit P-3, R 876-877, 504-505,
516) •
At about this time, Evans also formed two corporations
of which he was President.

The stock in both corporations was

owned by Evans with a few shares being held by his wife and
children. A Mr. Alton Cherry held five shares (Exhibit D-45) a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thereafter, machines were manufactured at Glendale, Arizona
under the Evans Company name and sold to the public (Exhibits
P-l and P-5)* Evans then commenced paying 2% commissions to
Mullins.

On August 23, 1968, Evans wrote to Mullins, telling

him they had had some difficulty with some of the machines
having a square shaft operating the segmented roller.

Because

of the problems, they would have to discount his commission on
31 machines to allow for the correction and conversion from the
square to a round shaft*

Mullins agreed to this.

Evans appar-

ently decided thereafter to sell his lucrative business and
entered into negotiations with defendant, Royal Industries
Corporation, Inc., for the sale of both of the Evans corporations,.0
one company made the machines and the other handled sales.

The

negotiations evidently were in progress when Evans wrote to
Mullins, telling him he was not going to pay him any more commissions on the machines being built.
August 23, 1968.

This letter was dated

It is interesting to note that in the merger

agreement of the Evans Companies with Royal Industries, there
appears to be a business cut-off date for the Evans Companies
so that acquisition could be completed.

That cut-off date is

indicated in the document as August 31, 1968, a week after
Evans1 letter (Exhibit D-45).
It is obvious from the two documents that Evans, knowing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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signature of one of appellants1 counsel, Lynn G. Foster.

He

had drawings made at Mullins1 shop without his knowledge and
thereafter, represented to the Patent Office that the square
shaft concept of the machine, as well as the safety device and
other matters, were the invention of the anonymous Floyd D.
Brinkman.
Shortly after Evans had attempted to cancel the commission contract, Royal Industries, through their accountants,
Price Waterhouse 5c Co., and their coionsel made a thorough study
and investigation of the records and accounts of both of the
Evans Companies with the idea of a corporate acquisition of the
same by way of merger.

A Vice President of Royal Industries

and a certified public accountant, by profession, Mr. Ted
Freedman, reviewed the Evans records and proposed merger with
other members of the corporation, their independent accountants,
and legal counsel, and approved the same. Mr. Freedman testified on cross-examination that it was thought by Royal Industries
that they were obtaining not only the assets, contracts and
physical plant of the Evans Companies but also their liabilities (R 909, 912, 919, 927 and 929)•

Mr. Freedman also testified

that although he did not know of the particular contractual
agreement between the Evans Companies and Mr. Mullins for the
two per cent commission, his company had fairly examined the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\r were assuming ail ot the obligations
as well as purchasing ail of the assets.
Mr. Evans testified concerning the merger" agreement and
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The

(

merger agreement clearly reflects that it was to encompass all
of the assets of the two Evans Companies, whether or not reflected in the balance sheet, and showed a balance sheet
furnished by the Evans Companies as of August 31, 1968, showing
Gross Sales of $926,124.00, with Gross Profits of $463,289.00
to said date.

The balance sheet also shows an Evans operating

profit for the year ending August 31, 1968 of $217,771.00.
The agreement further indicates in its body that there was a
general assignment by the Evans Companies to Royal Industries
of "all of its rights, title and interest to its agreement,
contracts, ... with other parties, including but not limited
to .... the exhibits and schedules thereto excepted ..."
Thereafter, the document also listed a bill of sale and agreement whereby Royal Industries acquired all contracts to which
the Evans Companies were a party (Exhibit D-45).
Evans then took over as President of the Evans Division
of Royal Industries and continued to manufacture the pinchroller machine designed by Mr. Mullins.

Production continued

at the same address in Arizona with photographs and brochures
of the same machine, the only change being the ownership shown
as the Evans Division of Royal Industries (Exhibits P-5 and
P-7).

After repeated demands by Mullins for payment of his

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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two per cent; commission, sui .t was brought for enforcement
thereof •
At t h e time t h e i n i t i a l machine was made for s a l e ,

$1,165.00.

Evans t e s t i f i e r

sell! 1 Ii lg for a p p r o x i m a t e

t h a t i n 19"*"
..

,

•

* ^ machine^

•
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o f f i c e of appe 11 a n t s

co\ inse II.

He a 1 l e g e s

l; hat, a j UTO m LO I i

him certain information about the conduct of the jurors and
thereafter, he attaches an unsigned affidavit, stating the
juror would not sign the same (R 399 or 438).

Such inadmissi-

ble self-serving hearsay is not worthy of further comment
(Glazier vs. Cramm, 71 Utah 465, 267 P. 188).
Counsel further recite in the factual statement the
allegation of continued delays in the trial but without any
reference to the record.
no delays whatsoever.

The record will reflect there were

The trial commenced on a Monday morning

and ran continuously through Thursday afternoon0

It was some

time after five o!clock p.m. when all of the evidence was in
and both sides rested their case.

The record clearly reflects

no unusual breaks, disturbances or anything of this nature.
Counsel then indicate that because of the illness of the judge
and his apparent inability to properly conclude the case, they
had been deprived of a fair trial.

Such is a "cheap shot11 at

the trial judge and without merit.

The record does not reflect

any objections or motions for mistrial or any other complaints
by counsel prior to the matter going to the jury.

None in fact

were made.
The trial judge indicated that his father-in-law had
passed away and he would need perhaps two days to make funeral
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arrangements and to attend the funeral before concluding the
case.

The case was recessed Thursday evening at the conclusion

of all evidence and both sides having rested.
the following Tuesday morning.

It reconvened

In the meantime, an infection

in the judgefs leg required that he be hospitalized for antibiotic treatment and rest.

The judge made it clear he was

under no sedatives or medication of any kind other than antibiotics although counsel attempt to so infer and did so state
in their Motion for a New Trial (R 1042-1043).

The trial

judge prepared all of the jury instructions he intended to
give to the jury and after signing them, delivered them to
Judge Bryant H. Croft, the presiding Judge, for presentation
to the jury.

Counsel were fully informed of the fact that

Judge Snow would not be instructing the jury but again, it is
pointed out, no objection was raised to another judge instructing the jury nor were any motions made or objections taken.
After counsel had reviewed the instructions, there were certain
questions which came to mind and objections to be raised thereto.

Judge Croft then contacted Judge Snow by telephone and

counsel were invited to go to the hospital and confer with
Judge Snow on those objectionable instructions.
so*

Counsel did

After approximately two hours of consultation, a recon-

sideration of some of the instructions was had and some were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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deleted from the judge's proposed instructions at defendants1
requests

Thereafter, the instructions were again signed by

Judge Snow with certain corrections and delivered to Judge
Croft for reading to the jury (R 321),

Judge Croft then con-

tacted Judge Snow by telephone to verify the fact that the
instructions had been corrected and were ready to be given.
He thereafter read the instructions to the jury#

The only

objections taken to the instructions by appdlants were those
normal and usual exceptions after the juryfs retirement.

No

motions were made for a mistrial or complaints entered at that
time (R 982).
The instructions were then given to the jury who retired,
deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
They also answered the special interrogatories requested by
appellants.
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT AGAINST APPELLANTS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS! MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE PROPER.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT AGAINST APPELLANTS.
Ralph Evans and Mr. Mullins commenced the manufacture
of the machine in question.

It was the two individuals who

were working together with the idea of future profits in mind.
Thereafter, Evans formed two wholly owned family corporations
to make and sell the machine in conjunction with Mullins1
efforts (R 712, Exhibit D-45).

At the commencement of their

business relationship, Evans agreed that he offered a partnership to Mullins and wanted him to move to Arizona.

When this

move was rejected, he indicated he would pay Mullins a percentage of the profits on the machine.

He later reduced their

agreement to writing (R 724-725, Exhibit P-3).

After a short

time, the two companies owned by Evans, his wife and children
were sold to Royal Industries.
H

Q.

Evans was asked:

Was the R. M. Evans a corporation as
such dissolved and the business purchased by the Royal Industries?

ff

A. Yes. The assets were purchased by
Royal Industries.

ff

Q. You mean the physical facilities as
well as the customer business, etc.?

ff

A#

That is right.
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M

Q.

When the R. M. Evans Corporation was
sold to Royal Industries, that is,
their assets, did you sell all of
the R0 M. Evans Company to Royal
Industries?

"A. Yes.
"Qo

So the R. M. Evans Corporation now
is merely a shell with no business
or assets?

"A.

That is right.

ft

Or customers or anything of that
nature?

"A.

That is right.

!l

Could you tell us if the facilities of the Evans Company, by that,
I mean the physical plant, etc.,
the equipment, etc. -- did all of
this go with the sale to the Royal
Industries?

Q.

Qo

fi

A. Yes.

fl

Was there anything withheld by the
R0 M, Evans Corporation other than
the corporate name when it was sold
to Royal Industries?

"A.

No.11

Q#

(R 710-711)

Thereafter, the machine in question was manufactured
and sold from the same plant using the same employees and the
same advertising brochures, with the exception of a sLight
change in name (Exhibits P-5 and P-7).
Royal Industries agreed to purchase the Evans Companies,
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lock, stock and barrel

(Exhibit D-45).

Royal assumed all

contractual obligations of the Evans Companies after August
31, 1968 (Exhibit D-45).

The machines produced thereafter

were subject to the two per cent commission agreement as a
contractual obligation assumed by Royal under the merger
agreement (Exhibit D-45).

Mr. Ted Freedman, the corporate

Vice President of Royal Industries, testified as follows:
"Qo

In the case of buying these assets
of these two corporations, did the
negotiations concern also assuming
some of the liabilities or all of
the liabilities of these two
corporations?

!f

Yes, the negotiations did involve
that.

ff

Was that considered part of the
purchase price?

A0

Qo

ff

A0

Yes."

(R 909)

Mr. Alton Cherry, a former stockholder of the Evans
Companies, testified that meetings were held with the Evans
corporation officers, and at those meetings, they did discuss
the fact that they were selling both assets and liabilities.
He was asked by appellants1 own counsel on direct examination
as follows:
fl

Q.

You, then as a stockholder—a former stockholder—of R. M. Evans
Company, you have any knowledge as
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to the nature of the sale to Royal
Industries; was that a sale of the
business, sale of the assets?
ff

A0

Oh, my understanding is--as a stockholder, I sat in on the majority of
the meetings—and it was a sale of
everything. It was a sale of assets;
liabilities were assumed/1 (Emphasis
supplied.) (R 803)

Mr. Freedman understood that Royal Industries was buying
all of the assets, liabilities and contracts of the Evans
Companies.

He further testified;

fl

Q.

Did you understand from the investigation and your inquiry of the matter
that there had been a full disclosure
so far as Royal Industries knew of
all liabilities and assets, and also
of all contract obligations which
would be a part of that agreement?

ff

A. Yes, that was my understanding. And
I had no reason to not believe that
that was the case.11 (R 912)

Mr. Freedman then went on to discuss the various accountants and other persons employed to review all of the corporate
records.

He was further asked on cross-examination:
"Q.

And it was Royal's understanding at
the time they made the purchase of
these two corporations controlled by
Mr. Evans that they were buying assets,
liabilities, physical plant, everything,
is that true, except for the stock?

M

Well, it was my understanding we were
buying the assets, liabilities as disclosed to us."

A.
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He further testified:
ff

And you thought at that time, didn!t
you, Mr, Freedman, that you were
getting all of the liabilities as
revealed by the company records?

ff

We had no reason to believe that
they were not all the liabilities.

lf

The fact still remains, does it not,
Mr. Freedman, when the deal was made
your company thought they were getting
all of the liabilities and the assets
in one lump; that is true, is it not?

ff

Yes. We thought that the liabilities
were all that the Evans Companies had."
(R 919, 927 and 929)

Qa

A.

Q«

A.

Ralph Evans testified that all of the records were available for review, including the Mullins agreement.

He thought

they had been thoroughly reviewed by Royal personnel or accountants on their behalf prior to the purchase (R 899, 962, 963 and
964).
As far as all of the parties to the merger were concerned,
there had been a complete purchase of the corporations and a
merger of all assets, liabilities, contracts, etc. The agreement
specifically recited an assumption of "all of its rights, title
and interest to its agreement, contracts, ... with other parties
...." (Exhibit D-45).
The Mullins agreement recites unequivocally that Mullins
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would receive a two per cent commission on the sales price of
the machine.

It states "As agreed, we will pay you a two per

cent (2%) commission on all EVANS EZY-BOND PINCH ROLLERS manufactured in Glendale, Arizona0lf

(Exhibit P-3)

If there is

ambiguity in the amount of commission to be paid, said ambiguity
should be resolved against the appellants as the contract was
drawn by them (Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 323, 400 P. 2d
503).
It is generally held that where a corporation merges or
purchases all of the assets and assumes the obligations and
contracts of another corporation, said acquisition includes all
obligations, whether they are inadvertently omitted from a list
or not.

See Sudakovich vs. Central Bank of Bingham, 62 Utah 24,

218 P.2d 113, wherein the Utah Supreme Court stated:
f,

We do not agree with appellantfs contention that the defendant assumed only such
liabilities as were listed and acknowledged.
There was no limitation expressed in the
offer of defendant and it must have been
understood by the receiver, the bank
commissioners, and the court as well, that
the settlement included every person who
might be found to be a depositor with the
bank.11

In the instant case, Royal has clearly indicated in its
agreement of merger that it was buying everything except those
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certain enumerated obligations.
excluded.

The Mullins contract was not

See also annotations at 15 ALR 1181 and 149 ALR 816*

See also Hogan vs. Price River Irrigation Company, 55 Utah 170,
184 P. 536; Forbes vs. Thorpe, 209 Mass. 570, 95 N.E. 955,
In the Forbes case, supra, the Massachusetts court ruled
that where all assets are transferred to another corporation,
together with liabilities expressly assumed, said corporation
cannot retain the property acquired and at the same time avoid
the payment of the debts which it agreed to pay as part of the
purchase price simply because the amount of the debt was misrepresented.

The court stated the purchaser clearly cannot

keep the advantages of a transaction and avoid the obligations.
In appellants1 brief, they cite the case of Parker vs.
Telegift International, Inc., 29 Utah 2d 87, 505 P.2d 301.
That case is not in any way comparable in facts with the instant
case.

In Parker, only the stock was sold, not its assets, con-

tracts, or liabilities.

In the instant case, appellant, Royal

Industries, purchased everything.

We would also agree with the

general rule that where a corporation purchases nothing but
assets and excludes contracts, obligations, and other liabilities, such may be done if valid consideration is given to the
stockholders of the selling corporation.

The general rule is

cited in Cooper vs. Utah Power & Light Company. 35 Utah 570,
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102 P.202 that there is no presumption that obligations are
assumed by purchase of assets only.

However, in the instant

case, the merger agreement was intended to assume and merge
all of the assets, liabilities, and contracts.

For this rea-

son, Ralph Evans, individually, and Royal Industries are liable
to the plaintiff to perform their obligations under the contract.
From 1969 to April of 1972, 350 machines had been manufactured and sold (R 974-975).

Evans claimed that during 1972, they

had lost some customers because of problems with the roller device in the machine and the company loss was about $40,000*00 in
sales.

At that time (1972), the machine was selling for about

$2,000.00 (R 955-956).

Evans admitted that at no time did Mullins

ever tell him he would guarantee the machine to work without having problems (R 958).

The selling price of the machine continued

to climb as the inflationary trend progressed (R 932).

On Page

22 of appellants1 brief, they represent to the court that there
are at least 393 machines sold and that a minimum amount owing to
Mullins under the contract would be $9,156.90, computing the
commission at the sale price in 1968.

They totally disregard the

fact that the contract calls for a 2% commission on the sale
price of each machine.

Appellants1 interrogatories asked the

jury this specific question*

See Interrogatory No. 2 (R 481).
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The jurors answered said question in the affirmative (R 578) 9
Tte jurors also found in Interrogatory No. 1 that appellant
Evans personally agreed to pay two per cent commission to
Mullins*
From the time the machines were originally constructed
until April of 1972, there were almost 400 machines soldo
This was for a period of approximately 3-1/2 years. From
April of 1972 until the time of trial, late June of 1975,
another three years had elapsed.

From this, the jurors could

easily conclude that approximately 400 more machines had been
made and sold if not more.

The machines were being sold around

the world*
Appellants1 counsel cites part of the argument to the
jury given by counsel for the respondent wherein a $40.00 commission figure was used as part of counselfs argument to the
jury.

This was based upon a sale figure in 1972 of $2,000.00.

The argument, of course, was in no way an indication to the
jury that this was the maximum amount coming to Mr 0 Mullins but
merely given to the jurors and so understood as an approximation of the amount of commissions due at the time of the answers
to interrogatories in 1972.
The appellants were in sole and complete control of the
books concerning the number of machines manufactured and the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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gross sales figures on the machine.

Counsel suggests that a

post-judgment accounting was made establishing the number of
machines actually sold to the date of trial.

The only account-

ing claimed to have been made by the appellants is a self-serving
affidavit by one of the appellants, Ralph Evans.

The affidavit

was signed on the 8th day of April, 1976, claiming a certain
number of machines had been sold.

This affidavit was filed

almost nine months after the case had been tried.

It was not

filed in accordance with any order of the court for an accounting nor was it filed at the request of the plaintiff.

It was

a self-serving affidavit filed after the case was on appeal,
apparently in an attempt to influence this Court, although not
part of the trial evidence (R 1062).

Plaintiff tried to estab-

lish the current selling price of the machine at the time of
trial but appellants objected thereto and the court sustained
the objection (R 956).

Appellants were and are in sole posses-

sion of all of the documentation as to selling price.

Because

of their own objections, appellants refused to allow respondent
to elicit the sales figures from appellants1 office personnel.
They were asked to produce the sales evidence on the number of
machines sold to date of trial and the sales figures as they
were in sole and exclusive possession of the same.
to do so.

They refused

The evidence in their exclusive control was purposely
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withheld.

There was evidence as to the number of machines sold

through April of 1972.

The jury was then required to estimate

those sold in the future because of the conduct of the appellants
of which they now complaint (R 770 to 776).
It is the universal rule that where one party is in sole
and exclusive possession of evidence pertaining to an accounting
or partnership case and refuses or fails to divulge that evidence,
the jury may conclude from what reasonable evidence is available
what the damages are.

In such an event, the party withholding

the evidence is not thereafter permitted to complain of the
juryfs findings where said party deliberately withheld the evidence.

See Fernandez vs. Garza, 88 Ariz. 214, 354 P02d 260

(Supreme Court of Arizona-1960).

The Arizona Supreme Court

stated:
fl

The defendant urges that since it cannot
be ascertained exactly how the sum of
$34,952.25 was derived, the judgment
cannot stand; but we do not think that
is a sufficient reason to upset the judgment. In Mollahan vs. Christy, 80 Ariz.
141, 294 P.2d 375, where the parties were
joint venturers, we said that the plaintiff who had placed his affairs in the
hands of the defendant was entitled to an
accounting and the burden was on the
defendant to support with competent evidence the disbursements made. This is in
accordance with the rule that since a
managing partner occupies the position
analogous to that of a trustee, he is
charged with the burden of making a faithfulDigitized
andby the
true
(Emphasis
Howardaccounting."
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law School, supplied.)
BYU.
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The court then went on to state:
"It has also been held that the burden
of producing evidence at a trial should
be shifted once it is shown that the
defendants control over the accounts
was exclusive.ff
(Wilson vs. Mo line,
229 Minn. 164, 38 N.W.2d 201.)
It is respectfully submitted that there was ample evidence to show that at least in 1972, the sale price on the
machine in question was $2,000.00 and there had been sold
approximately 385 machines.

The jurors well could have con-

cluded that at least a like amount of machines were made in
the following three years and sold at a price admittedly in
excess of $2,000.00 per machine.

It was the statement of

appellant Evans that the price continuously rose on the machines due to inflation.
In any event, it was the duty of the appellants who
were in exclusive control of the records to bring forth the
records during the time of trial as

to the actual total gross

sales figure on the machine in question.
so.

They refused to do

They therefore should not now be allowed to complain,,
According to Exhibit D-45, the merger agreement, the

financial statement of the Evans Companies show that they were
grossing in sales in excess of $900,000.00 a year at the time
of the merger.

There is ample evidence from the figures given
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at the time of trial from which a jury could conclude that well
over $50,000.00 in commissions was owing to Mr 0 Mullins for
6-1/2 years of sales0
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTSf MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL.
The appellants, after the juryfs verdict had been rendered,
then moved for a new trial, claiming ambiguities in interrogatories and the answers given thereto.

In their brief, they recite

those to which they object.
Interrogatory No. 24, as referred to on Page 42 of their
brief, asks whether or not plaintiff Mullins was paid by
fl

No.M

Mr. Evans personally to which the jurors answered

The

uncontradicted evidence was that the checks were drawn on the
corporate account and the jurors obviously so found0
Interrogatory No. 25 asks whether or not Mullins was
paid by the corporation*

The jurors answered "Yes11 to this

question which obviously is correct---the funds were paid in
the form of corporate checks from the Evans family-owned corporation.
No. 26 asks whether or not the plaintiff was providing
services in the manufacture of the machine for the Evans
Corporation to which the jurors answered "Yes."

Obviously,
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Mr 0 Mullins started his work with Mr. Evans personally and
after the incorporation, continued working with Mr* Evans and
for his family corporation.

There is nothing inconsistent

about this answer.
Question No. 27 asks whether or not Mr. Mullins was
also providing services in developing the machine for Mr. Evans
as an individual to which the jurors answered "Yes."

The evi-

dence is clear that such was the case. Mr. Evans, as an
individual, solicited Mullins to help make the machine and also,
later on informed him that he and his family had formed a
corporation for the production and sale of the machine.

There

is no inconsistency in the answer.
On Pages 42 and 43 of their brief, they refer to the
answers given to Interrogatory Numbers 1 and 30. Their questions are ambiguous in that they refer to certain payments but
do not specify what payments.

The jurors answered these ques-

tions; however, the interrogatories were requested by appellants
and they should not now be allowed to complain about their construction
They complain

about the answer to Interrogatory No* 1

wherein the jurors found that there was a contract entered into
whereby Mullins was to be paid two per cent of the sales price
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of the machine to which the jurors answered

ff

Yes0fl

There appears

to be nothing ambiguous about that answer0
In regard to Interrogatory No, 28, the jurors answered the
question as being "Undecided."

Appellants were apparently asking

the jurors to make a determination as to what the thoughts were
of Mr. Mullins.

The jurors apparently had not decided what his

thoughts were and evidently found the question ambiguous,,
Question No. 29 complained of is also consistent with the
other answers given by the jurors.

The question asks whether or

not the plaintiff understood that defendant Evans was acting
solely in his capacity as an officer of the corporation to which
the jurors answered

ff

N0o,f

He was also acting on his own behalf0

On Page 45 of their brief, they complain about an answer
given to Interrogatory No. 43 wherein it was asked of the jurors
if Royal Industries knowingly agreed to assume and fulfill the
terms of a letter memorandum dated April 11, 1967. The jurors
answered "No*11

One of the witnesses for Royal Industries stated

that he did not knowingly recall the particular agreement with
Mr 0 Mullins at the time of the merger.

Evans said the Mullins

agreement was available for review along with the other corporate
records.

The jurors1 answer in such event was not inconsistent.

This does now however mean that the merger agreement and the
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understanding of the parties did not contemplate the acceptance
of the Mullins' contract in accordance with the terms and provisions of Exhibit D-45.
This Court has repeatedly stated that judgments will be
sustained if supported by any substantial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.

Jensen vs. Eddy, 30 Utah

2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142.
This Court has also stated that the amount of damages
awarded by a jury is a matter of discretion.

Hirabelli vs.

Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172.
It has also repeatedly been held that a jury's conduct
cannot be impeached by affidavits of the jurors unless their
conduct is the direct result of a quotient or chance verdict.
A juror is not permitted to impeach a verdict by giving an affidavit that the other jurors did not understand the evidence.
Stringham vs. Broderick, 529 P„2d 425; Vernon Smith vs. Wilmer
Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 240, 408 P.2d 709; Hathaway vs. Marks, 21
Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850.

Nor will the courts go behind the

jury's answers to interrogatories to analyze or speculate as to
the manner in which the jurors arrived at their decision.
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District vs. Nelson, supra.

See

also Hepworth vs. Covey Brothers Amusement Company, 97 Utah 205,
91 P.2d 507. All of the issues raised by appellants in their
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Motion for a New Trial were duly considered by the trial court.
The motion was denied, and properly so.
POINT III
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE JURY WERE PROPER.
The instructions given to the jury were almost verbatim
as requested by appellants herein.

Of course, the court did

give some of respondents requests and denied others.
On Page 26 of appellants1 brief, they continually refer
to the courtfs preparation of the instructions in the hospital.
Such is not the case.

The instructions were prepared by Judge

Snow and given to Judge Croft before Judge Snow went into the
hospital.

The only discussions about instructions in the hospital

were those discussions concerning certain objections that appellants voiced about the instructions which were reviewed by Judge
Snow at the hospital.

Some of the courtfs instructions were

omitted by agreement of counsel and the court.
Appellants complain of Instruction No. 30.

This instruction

told the jurors that if they found the issues in favor of respondent, they should, by a preponderance of the evidence, determine
the machines sold and the amount of damages suffered by respondent.

There was nothing erroneous in this instruction.

The argu-

ment against giving such an instruction by appellants is based
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solely on their own view of the evidence and obviously not
based upon the evidence as found by the jurors.
Instruction No. 31 to which they object is clearly the
law.

It merely tells the jurors that since defendants drew the

agreement, any ambiguity should be resolved against them0
is fundamental contract law.

This

Seal vs. Tayco, Inc., supra.

Appellants attempt to claim that Royal Industries should not be
held to the same burden of the instruction since it merely
assumed the agreement by contract and was not a party to it.

It

is respectfully submitted that Royal assumed the agreement and
all of the necessary rights and obligations therein.

They cer-

tainly are not in the position to claim that any ambiguities
should be resolved in their favor.
Instruction No. 32, which was objected to by appellants,
correctly states the law.

The court instructed the jurors that

if they found that Royal Industries purchased the obligations
and assets of the Evans Companies that they may have acquired
the obligation, either expressly or by implication, and could
become legally responsible.

The facts clearly indicate by the

merger agreement and testimony that there was such an assumption
of obligations and contracts and such instruction was clearly
the law of the case (Exhibit D-45).
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Instruction No 0 33 merely told the jurors that in such
an acquisition, as is evidenced by Exhibit D-45, there was a
merger or as such, the transaction amounted to a merger, and
that Royal Industries not only acquired the assets of the Evans
Companies but also acquired their contractual obligations*

This,

of course, is the law*
Counsel then complains of the instructions regarding
merger or acquisition of assets and cites Parker vs* Telegift
International, Inc 0 , supra, which has previously been referred
to and is not appropriate to the facts of this case*

In the

Parker case, there was no transfer of assets, contracts, obligations, or anything of this nature.

It was merely a purchase

of corporate stock*
Instruction No* 34 applied to Mr, Evans as he later on
admittedly became what was termed as the President of the Evans
Division of Royal Industries and as such, managed the division*
This was the division which continued making the machine in
question and any conduct and knowledge of Mr* Evans after that
time became the conduct of the corporation.

This instruction

referred to his knowledge of machine sales*
Instruction No* 35 is merely a recitation of what is the
law*

The corporation, Royal Industries, obviously intended to
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purchase all of the contracts of the Evans Companies and knew,
or should have known, when they purchased everything but three
or four enumerated obligations, as set forth in the purchase
agreement, they were purchasing the Mullins obligation.

They

cannot accept the benefits of producing the Mullins machine
without paying his commission.

Their own merger document,

Exhibit D-45, clearly shows their intention to acquire all contractual obligations regardless of those being enumerated and
it specifically excluded only certain obligations involving
potential litigation.

The Mullins agreement was not so listed

and therefore, logically must be assumed to have been part of
the purchase agreement and merger.
Instruction No. 36 merely told the jurors that they
were to assess the damages in the event of a finding in favor
of the plaintiff and the damages should be two per cent of the
sales price of each machine#

Such was the interpretation placed

on the agreement by appellants in their request to the court
for answers to certain interrogatories.

The court, in addition

thereto, told the jurors that in the event the value of the
machine and its sales price fell below the figure of $1,165.00,
that such an award should be made on the lesser price.
It would logically follow that in the event the price

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

went above this figure, the jurors would also assess damages
accordinglyo
In reference to Instruction No. 39, the jurors again
were told that if it was the intent of all of the parties
concerned that the two per cent commission was to carry over
to

whoever made the machine by virtue of authority from

Evans that said commission would apply.

The jurors also were

clearly told they must make such a finding of fact before they
should find the issues against Evans personally.
so found.

The jurors

It should also again be noted that the agreement

about which the court was talking refers to Evans and his
corporations as ffwe,fl indicating more than one party was to be
bound (Exhibit P-3)o
In Instruction No. 41, the court gave the general instruction to the jury regarding knowledge of corporate officers
concerning business of the corporation.

Such is a generally

acknowledged stock instruction and a correct statement of the
law.

It not only applied to Evans but to other officers of

Royal Industries that searched the records of the Evans
Companies in preparation for the merger agreement, and so testified.
Appellants then complain about certain requested instructions that were not given by the court.

They object to their
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Requested Instruction No0 19 as not having been given*

This

request is both ambiguous and effectually takes away the
issue of facts from the jury and was properly refused.
Requested Instruction No. 29 is also tantamount to a
directed verdict and was properly refused*

There obviously

were many issues of fact to be decided by the jury as was
evidenced by appellants1 request that the court submit 46
special interrogatories to determine these issues*

The court

granted their request and gave all the special interrogatories.
Requested Instruction No. 31 also was tantamount to a
directed verdict as to certain issues and was properly refused.
In reference to Requested Instruction No. 33, the court
essentially instructed the jury on all of the issues contained
therein.

The request however contains certain phraseology which

takes away from the jury certain issues of fact and was adequately
covered in the other instructions.
Requested Instruction No. 34 also was properly refused
in that the court covered the issues encompassed within said
request in other instructions and said request ignored the
family ownership of the Evans companies and other pertinent
matters.
The other requested instructions by the appellants were
given in substance as they pertain to the issues but insofar as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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they were couched in such terms as to be inadequate, they
were properly refused*
Appellants further claim that the jurors1 answers to
the special interrogatories requested by them were inconsistento
This matter has been reviewed previously herein and no further
comment deemed necessary0

The question of whether or not there

was an agreement by Mullins to accept payment from Evans in
full as claimed was decided by the jurors1 answers to special
interrogatories where they found the issues in favor of Mullins*
They were issues of fact and disposed of the matter of accord,
satisfaction or release0
Appellants further claim there was no consideration to
support the contractual agreement for the payment of the two
per cent commission*

The evidence is virtually uncontradicted

that Evans wanted Mullins to become a partner with him in the
construction of the machine and when Mullins refused to move
his residence and quit his job to become such a partner, it was
then decided that in exchange for his design ideas, work and
other development efforts, he should receive the TL commission*
Some payments were actually made by appeHants 0

Mullins

accepted the same and is still willing to accept his commissions
as payment for his development of the machine.
found.

The jurors so

Counsel claims that Mullins held the property of Evans
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and, in effect, exacted an agreement from him to pay commissions
before he would release the unfinished machines, jigs, and other
toolSo

The jury found to the contrary*.
Counsel then claims that the selling agreement and com-

mission payments were only to be made as long as they were
manufactured by Evans«

The facts clearly indicate they are

still being manufactured under Evans Division of Royal Industries
which was a merger of the Evans Companies.

They are being made

at the same place of business as they were originally manufactured in Arizona and even using the same photographs, name,
etc., as previously indicated.
merit.

Such an argument is without

The jurors so found in their answers to appellants1

interrogatories.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully represented by
respondent herein that he was the victim of sharp practices from
beginning to end.

His partner, Evans, through legal counsel,

Lynn Go Foster, made drawings of the machine being developed
by Mullins and submitted the same for patent without Mullins1
knowledge.

The patent was placed in the name of a third party

with an immediate transfer to Evans upon its issuance to circumvent any claim by Mullins.
in the evidence.

This is very clearly documented

Not knowing all the facts, Mullins agreed to
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accept two per cent of the sales price of each machine sold
by Evans and his companies as adequate consideration for
Mullins1 inventive efforts*

Damages were so awarded by the

jury.
The merger with Royal Industries by Evans and his
family-owned companies did not change the agreement in any
manner.

The merger agreement fully contemplated an assumption

of all contracts.
The evidence is clear that almost 400 machines were
made prior to the answers to interrogatories in April 1972 and
three years further production and sales were as yet unaccounted
for.

Appellants steadfastly refused to produce evidence as to

what the sales figures were to allow the jury to give an exact
verdict if they saw fit.

They required the jurors to calculate

the production based upon the answers to interrogatories as to
prior sales figures and the increase in prices and award a judgment accordingly.

They should not now be allowed to complain of

such calculations through their own misconduct.

The verdict and

judgment rendered in the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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